

WASHINGTON HOPEFUL OF RUSSIA'S FIGHTING

Separate Peace Not Expected—Financial Help From Allies to Continue—Radicals Not Regarded as Permanently in Control—Kerensky's Weakness Deplored.

ACCORDING to the consensus of opinion in Washington, the most hopeful, also the most reasonable way of getting at an answer to the hypothetical question of a separate peace on the part of Russia, even in this darkest hour of that country's trials, is by means of asking a similar question concerning other countries—a question which, in the case of these other countries, is only apparently, not actually, more absurd.

Would France, for example, make a separate peace, no matter what her extremity, if peace meant the permanent loss of her territory which Germany now occupies in the north?

Would Italy make a separate peace if such a peace meant the permanent occupation by Germans and Austrians of the Venetian plains which they have overrun in the last fortnight?

To ask a third question, which in America, at least, seems even more absurd, would the United States make peace if it meant the loss of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, which Germany solemnly promised to Mexico as a reward for making war on this country?

The emphatic negative to each of these questions is and always will be entirely regardless of the successes or failures of any leader or group of leaders in any of the countries concerned.

The same is true of Russia. At least, Washington is convinced it is. Will Russia make a separate peace which would surely mean to her the loss of the Baltic provinces and of Poland, which Germany now occupies? Absolutely no. And here, too, the answer is entirely apart from the present crisis in Petrograd, entirely independent of the personal fate of Kerensky or a thousand Kerenskys.

Russia may have civil war, (that seems as probable as anything else at the moment;) she may succeed in establishing an orderly form of republican government, without such a civil war or as the result of it; she may go back, temporarily, to some form of monarchy as the price of getting straightened out for a fresh start. But Russia will not voluntarily submit to territorial dismemberment. A separate peace with Germany now would mean nothing less than that.

Therefore, Russia will make no separate peace. Germany's agents who control the Bolsheviki, now apparently in the saddle at the Russian capital, will continue to go through the motions of formulating peace terms, and they may go so far as to substitute open for secret negotiations with Berlin for peace. They may even declare peace. But it will mean nothing to Russia, because Russia will realize that the peace means loss of vast areas of her land.

The two chief promises of the Bolsheviki and the Maximalists eat up each other. They say: "Let us make a democratic and separate peace and then divide all the land of Russia among the people." But the peace would remove more than 200,000 square miles of the land to be divided and place all that territory, with its population of something like 20,000,000 of people, within the permanent boundaries of Germany. Most of it is now occupied by the enemy armies.

Germany, according to the views held in Washington, is as determined today to hold Courland, Esthonia, Livonia, and Poland, to make Finland a part of her

system, as she was to take and hold Alsace-Lorraine forty-six years ago. She even goes to the unnecessary trouble of making excuses that she thinks will sound well in history years hence. She harped for years on the fact that the German language was spoken in Alsace and Lorraine. She is making the most of the fact now that the German language is largely used in the Baltic provinces. Pan Germanism includes those provinces. German armies occupy them. Fighting is the only way by which Russia can get them back. Eventually Russia will fight. The only alternative to making a separate peace, which would mean territorial dismemberment, is to continue to make war to recover what is lost.

If the Russian peasants were as densely ignorant and stolid and indifferent as the most hopeless pessimists paint them, they would still find in the cutting up of their own nation something to rouse themselves against. All Russia still resents the peace that was framed in Portsmouth, N. H., whereby she lost everything she had been fighting for in the remote East. She will surely have nothing of a separate peace with Germany when she realizes that she would thereby lose 200,000 square miles of Russia in Europe.

The Bolsheviki do not call the thing they are striving for a separate peace, but a "democratic peace," a democratic peace with Germany, and there they reach the furthest limits of contradiction of terms—a democratic peace with an autocracy, whose only terms will be annexation and permanent occupancy of all the territory that has been conquered.

The Allies look for another general peace offer from Berlin before Christmas, another like that of last December. They expect, as a matter of course, that it will be in the same vague, meaningless terms. Russia will ask if the terms include the restoration of all the Russian territory now occupied by the enemy. Germany will not say yes. Russia will know then, if she does not know now, what she has to do in the future.

Mere neutrality will not help Russia. If she should withdraw her armies now in the field the two million Teutonic troops now held on the eastern front would not all go to France or Italy. Many divisions would simply go further into Russian territory, unmolested, and increase the area that Russia would have to regain by fighting later on. Neither would switching about from the side of the Allies to that of Germany in the war help Russia, no matter how much it might harm the rest of us. Germany robs her allies as well as her enemies whenever she can. Germany has conquered certain sections of Russia that she wants for herself, that she has wanted for years. This settles the whole matter so far as Germany is concerned. For Germany to give up what she is not compelled to give up is unthinkable. It is conceivable that she will promise not to take any more Russian territory if Russia will support her for the remainder of the war. It is not conceivable that Russia would enter into any such agreement. This, at any rate, is the opinion expressed unofficially by those in Washington who are in a position to appraise the situation.

Two days before the downfall of Kerensky several members of the Ameri-

can Government and men in the war missions of the Allies stationed in Washington were asked if they thought that the United States and England and France should continue to help Russia with money and supplies in spite of her failure to do all that she ought to do toward winning the war for all the countries involved. The men to whom the question was put have a great deal to say in the matter of furnishing help to Russia. They were unanimous in declaring that the help should continue. Three days later, after the fall of Kerensky, these men were asked if they still thought the same way about helping Russia. They said they did. Again they were unanimous.

They referred to the impossibility of a separate peace for Russia without dismemberment, and on that fact banked their hope that Russia would continue to be a factor in the war and their determination not to abandon her because of her domestic difficulties.

To be entirely frank in the matter, the most recent upset in Russia is not looked upon in Washington as an unmixed evil. At the time of the Korniloff affair in September, throughout the few days that it lasted, there was a rather definite hope, not publicly expressed in London, Paris, and Washington, that the forceful, practical Cosack General would supersede the idealist, Kerensky. And now, although this time Kerensky has been driven from Petrograd by the Bolsheviki agents of Germany, there is again hope that the outcome of the affair will be an entirely new leadership. Nobody says so yet, because the period of mourning for Kerensky as a fallen leader has not expired. But the news from Petrograd or Moscow that another Lvoff or Milukoff or Korniloff had assumed the headship of affairs in Russia would be much more reassuring to the Allies than information to the effect that Kerensky had succeeded in getting himself reinstated.

Kerensky failed because he tried to do too many things at once and to be too many things to too many different groups. Everybody knows that now. He tried to establish a dream Utopia in Russia at the same time that he was trying to keep the wolves out of Russia. He expected sympathy and co-operation from traitors in return for kindness, which he gave them instead of the punishment that the situation absolutely demanded. Because of his methods the efforts of Russia have been nullified at every point by the Germans within Russia, and their agents. One group after another has had its day, but the Russian people as a whole, the Russian people who eventually will fight to save their country from being cut up by Germany, have had no real chance since the early days of the revolution of last March and the days when such moderates as Lvoff and Milukoff were in brief control. It was then contemplated that all the people would have their say as to the permanent form of government which their country would take through the great constituent assembly scheduled for early in September. It is now the middle of November. No such assembly has been held. In its place there have been all sorts of makeshifts, which have got nowhere. The excuse for this delay in letting all Russia come together by means of its representatives to settle its own destinies has been and is that Russia was not

yet educated sufficiently in self-government to make a good job of a constitution-making enterprise. There was fear that the peasants and farmers would not be sufficiently moderate in the taking of the lands that had come to them with the fall of the despotism.

So, in place of the danger that was problematical from the agricultural elements of the population in their use of the land, there has been the danger that is real from the industrialists and Socialists and their various councils, who would give away 200,000 square miles of that same land to Germany as the price of a separate peace. But the people who have brought about this danger are in a ridiculously small minority as compared with the entire population of Russia. With the enforced retirement from power of the man who has failed to handle this minority, who has not made use of the tremendous forces latent in the majority of the people, there may come immediately (there is bound to come eventually) a new régime that will put Russia into the war as a more aggressive factor to help the Allies and at the same time establish reasonable order within her own boundaries.

In the meantime it is not fair to say that Russia is not something of a factor in the war, a good deal of a factor, even under the present conditions. She is still holding 2,000,000 German and Austrian troops on the eastern front, and she has, in the course of the last three years, had her periods of great victory. So the United States and the other allies will continue to help Russia even though circumstances compel them to help her in the spirit of a man who takes a chance on a long shot. They do not think they are taking any longer chances now than in the days of the Czar.

The likelihood of a separate peace today is less than it was in the days of the Czar. The influences controlling Nicholas were all pro-German. The Russian people will sooner or later control Russia. All hate Germany and know what to expect of her.

There is a historical parallel for all this in the French Revolution of 1848, with its radicals, reactionaries, and moderate republicans, and with the bulk of the people disgusted with the foreign policy of Louis Philippe—a policy of going in to the absolutist Governments of Central Europe. The Second Republic grew out of the Revolution of 1848. There is also a historical precedent for the Baltic provinces in the doom of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871.